Wrongful Death of Children in Oklahoma: Statutory Expansion of Recoverable Damages by Hamilton, Ellen M.
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 11 Issue 1 
1975 
Wrongful Death of Children in Oklahoma: Statutory Expansion of 
Recoverable Damages 
Ellen M. Hamilton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Ellen M. Hamilton, Wrongful Death of Children in Oklahoma: Statutory Expansion of Recoverable 
Damages, 11 Tulsa L. J. 98 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol11/iss1/9 
This Casenote/Comment is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more 
information, please contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
WRONGFUL DEATH OF CHILDREN IN OKLAHOMA:
STATUTORY EXPANSION OF
RECOVERABLE DAMAGES
One summer afternoon a fourteen-year-old girl was swimming with
her friends in a municipal swimming pool when she suddenly disap-
peared from view. It was discovered that she had been sucked into a
twelve-inch diameter pipe under the water's surface and drowned while
trying to free herself. Her father brought a wrongful death action and
recovered $2000 for the loss of her services during her minority and
$8000 for her services after her majority.'
Genta Marie, a child of 2 years and 9 months, and her grandmoth-
er were killed when the automobile in which they were riding was
involved in an accident. The child's parents recovered $10,000 in a
wrongful death action.2
What do these cases have in common?
The measure of damages in both cases was based solely, at least in
theory, on the "pecuniary loss" of the child to the parents as next of kin8
under the existing wrongful death statute.4 The parents' emotional
suffering and loss of companionship and love apparently were not
considered. 5 Both cases would have undoubtedly involved higher judg-
ments if brought after October 1, 1975, the effective date of a recently
enacted statute6 which expands the measure of damages in recovering
for the wrongful death of a child.
This note will discuss the individual elements of recovery under the
new statute, the reasons for its enactment, and the problems involved in
interpreting its effective date.
THE NEW WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTE
The new Act provides:
In all actions hereinafter brought to recover damages for
the death of an unmarried, unemancipated minor child, the
1. Fike v. Peters, 175 Okla. 334, 52 P.2d 700 (1935).
2. Stevens v. Schickendanz, 316 P.2d 1111 (Okla. 1957).
3. Rogers v. Worthan, 465 P.2d 431, 438 (Okla. 1970).
4. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1971).
5. Natl Tank Co. v. Scott, 191 Okla. 613, 617, 130 P.2d 316, 320 (1942); Blunt v.
Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 70 Okla. 149, 150, 173 P. 656, 657 (1918).
6. 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 213-14, to be codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1055 (Supp.
1975).
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damages recoverable shall include medical and burial expense,
loss of anticipated services and support, loss of companionship
and love of the child, destruction of parent-child relation-
ship and loss of monies expended by parents or guardian in
support, maintenance and education of such minor child,
in such amount as, under all circumstances of the case, may
be just."
What exactly are the elements of damages recoverable under the
new statute?
Medical and Burial Expenses
Oklahoma case law already allows medical and burial expenses" as
damages in a wrongful death action under the general wrongful death
statute, which the new statute supplements. Therefore, there has been
no change in the existing law in this area.
Loss of Anticipated Services and Support
In Oklahoma, pecuniary loss is the measure of damages in a
wrongful death action to recover for the death of a child.10 It appears,
that the phrase loss of anticipated services and support in the new statute
merely restates the traditional rule.
Pecuniary loss is determined by the sums of money and the acts
and services of a pecuniary value which the child would likely have
earned and contributed for the benefit of his parents had his death not
occurred."- This pecuniary loss includes "anything of a monetary value"
to the claimant'" and "anything that was merely reasonably probable"
7. 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 213-14, to be codified as Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 1055 (Supp.
1975) amending OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1971) which provides in pertinent part:
When the death of one is caused by the wrongful act or omission of another,
the personal representative of the former may maintain an action therefor
against the latter, . . . if the former might have maintained an action had he
lived, against the latter . . . for an injury for the same act or omission ...
The damages must inure to the exclusive benefit of the surviving spouse and
children, if any, or next of kin; to be distributed in the same manner as per-
sonal property of the deceased.
8. Crossett v. Andrews, 277 P.2d 117, 118 (Okla. 1954); Stanolind Oil & Gas Co.
v. Jamison, 204 Okla. 93, 98-99, 227 P.2d 404, 410 (1951).
9. OKA . STAT. tit. 12, § 1053 (1971), amended by 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 213-14.
10. Rogers v. Worthan, 465 P.2d 431, 437 (Okla. 1970); Sample v. Campbell, 305
P.2d 1033 (Okla. 1957); Parkhill Trucking Co. v. Hopper, 208 Okla. 429, 430, 256 P.2d
810, 812 (1953).
11. Southwestern Light & Power Co. v. Fowler, 119 Okla. 244, 248, 249 P. 961, 965.
(1926); Kaw Boiler Works v. Frymyer, 100 Okla. 81, 88, 227 P. 453, 459 (1924).
12. Okmulgee Gas Co. v. Kelly, 105 Okla. 189, 232 P. 428 (1924).
1975]
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that the claimant would have received.' 3
It is conceded that actual earning capacity is more difficult to
gauge in the death of a child than in the case of an adult. If there is no
exact testimony regarding the economic conditions under which the
child was raised or the amount of financial contributions he would have
made to his parents, the law presumes at least nominal damages;' 4 and a
jury may determine the pecuniary loss and allow substantial damages
using its members' judgment and experience, knowing only the age, sex
and condition in life of the deceased child.' 5
In determining the pecuniary loss measure of damages there is a
preferred instruction that a deduction for educational and maintenance
expenses, or the "upkeep" of the child, should be made from the
child's contributions,'" but failure to so instruct is not reversible error.,
This is true because "actual pecuniary loss" already contemplates that
such deductions be made.' 8 In many cases, parents spend more on
a child than they might ever receive as benefits from the child. There-
fore, juries tended to "wink at" actual proof of damages and grant
awards not quite substantiated by evidence so as not to leave parents
with a cause of action but without adequate compensation.19 The Okla-
homa Legislature, by enacting the new statute, has attempted to provide
for substantial recovery for the actual damages sustained and to insure
that juries need not resort to a biased viewing of evidence or to legal
fictions.
Under the existing general wrongful death statute, there has been
some confusion as to the circumstances under which damages may be
allowed for contributions the decedent would have made after reaching
majority. Most states, including Oklahoma, allow the recovery of these
damages."0 Recovery based on contributions after the child's majority
has generally been awarded on account of a parent's dependency and
the reasonable expectations that the contributions would be made.2 '
13. Weleetka Cotton Oil Co. v. Brookshire, 65 Okla. 293, 166 P. 408 (1917).
14. Lakeview, Inc. v. Davidson, 166 Okla. 171, 173, 26 P.2d 760, 762 (1933).
15. Id. at 171, 26 P.2d at 760.
16. Sample v. Campbell, 305 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Okla. 1957); Stanolind Oil & Gas
Co. v. Jamison, 204 Okla. 93, 99, 227 P.2d 404, 410 (1951); Fike v. Peters, 175 Okla.
334, 338, 52 P.2d 700, 704 (1935).
17. Sample v. Campbell, 305 P.2d 1033, 1036 (Okla. 1957).
18. Lakeview, Inc. v. Davidson, 166 Okla. 171, 173, 26 P.2d 760, 762 (1933).
19. See Finkelstein, Pickrel & Glasser, The Death of Children: A Nonparametric
Statistical Analysis of Compensation for Anguish, 74 COLUM. L. Rnv. 884, 892 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Finkelstein].
20. W. PRossnn, LAw oF ToRTs 909 (4th ed. 1971).
21. Parkhill Trucking Co. v. Hopper, 208 Okla. 429, 432, 256 P.2d 810, 813 (1953);
[Vol. 11:98
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But there is some authority that damages can be awarded only until the
time of majority or that an award of contributions after majority is er-
ror.
22
Rogers v. Worthan,23 involving the death of an eighteen-year-old
son, provided some clarification of this issue by holding that a parent's
dependency is not a factor in the recovery of damages. Although the
opinion did not mention majority as being a limit on the period for
which damages are figured, it can be argued that damages for the period
after the decedent's majority must have been a consideration in order to
support the award of $25,000 for the death of the decedent.
The court in finding that the award was not excessive relied on
evidence that the decedent would have made contributions to his moth-
er, who was not in prime health, and that he had intended to put his
younger brother through college after he finished his own college educa-
tion.24 The rule was stated to be:
Recovery in a wrongful death action is not contingent
upon a showing that the claimant had been dependent, to some
extent, upon the deceased. Even great wealth would not, of
itself, preclude the recovery of damages for any pecuniary
benefits which a claimant might, reasonably, have expected to
receive if the deceased had lived.25
In the Rogers case, the basic factor determining whether there
would be recovery was not the parent's dependence, but rather whether
it could
reasonably be said that there was a probability, or a rea-
sonable expectancy on the part of the claimant, that the de-
cedent, except for his death, would have contributed money,
Foster v. Higginbotham, 186 Okla. 276, 277, 97 P.2d 63, 64 (1939); Fike v. Peters, 175
Okla. 334, 339, 52 P.2d 700, 705 (1935); Folsom-Morris Coal Mining Co. v. Morrow,
102 Okla. 33, 34, 226 P. 53, 54 (1924); Weleetka Cotton Oil Co. v. Brookshire, 65 Okla.
293, 296, 166 P. 408, 410 (1917); Muskogee Elec. Traction Co. v. Hairel, 46 Okla. 409,
415-16, 148 P. 1005, 1007 (1915).
22. Hathaway v. Beatley, 127 F. Supp. 634, 636 (W.D. Okla. 1955); Hart v. Lewis,
187 Okla. 394, 397, 103 P.2d 65, 68 (1940) where the court held that although an
instruction failing to omit damages at the time the deceased reached majority was error,
it was not reversible error where the verdict was not excessive; Lakeview, Inc. v.
Davidson, 166 Okla. 171, 173, 26 P.2d 760, 762 (1933); Shawnee Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Motesenbocker, 41 Okla. 454, 457, 138 P. 790, 793 (1914).
23. 465 P.2d 431 (Okla. 1970).
24. Id. at 439. Oklahoma's lowering of the age of majority from 21 to 18 for males
has obviously left the Rogers rule unimpaired. OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, § 13 (Supp. 1974)
defines majority. See Bassett v. Bassett, 521 P.2d 434 (Okla. App. 1974) holding that
Oklahoma's former statute defining minors as females under 18 and males under 21 was
unconstitutional as violative of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
25. Id. at 438.
1975]
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aid, services, or anything else that would have a pecuniary
value to the claimant.20
Hopefully, a definitive case will be decided to clear up this confused
area.
Loss of Companionship and Love of the Child
Although recovery for loss of companionship of the deceased child
has been allowed under several states' statutes27 the term itself has not
been uniformly defined. Perhaps the most useful description thus far is:
Just as with respect to a manufacturing plant, or industrial
machine, value involves the costs of acquisition emplacement,
upkeep, maintenance service, repair, and renovation, so, in
our context, we must consider the expenses of birth, of food,
of clothing, of medicines, of instruction, of nurture and shel-
ter. Moreover, just as an item of machinery forming part of
a functioning industrial plant has a value over and above that
of a similar item in a showroom, awaiting purchase, so an in-
dividual member of a family has a value to others as part of
a functioning social and economic unit. This value is the
value of mutual society and protection, in a word, compan-
ionship. The human companionship thus afforded has a defi-
nite substantial, and ascertainable pecuniary value and its loss
forms a part of the "value" of the life we seek to ascer-
tain .... 28
How the pecuniary amount is ascertained, though, seems contingent on
evidentiary factors subject to a jury's consideration. This element will
also be discussed in the next section.
Destruction of the Parent-Child Relationship
The new Oklahoma statute bears a remarkable resemblance to the
1967 amendment to the Washington wrongful death statute which states
in part:
[DIamages may be recovered for the loss of love and com-
panionship of the child and for injury to or destruction of the
parent-child relationship in such amount as, under all circum-
stances of the case, may be just.29
26. Id. at 439.
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (Supp. 1975-76); HAwAII REV. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (Supp. 1974); Ky. RaV. STAT. § 411.135 (1970);
NEV. REv. STAT. § 41.090 (1973); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 424.010 (Supp. 1974);
Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-1066 (Supp. 1975).
28. Wycko v. Gnodtke, 361 Mich. 331, 333, 105 N.W.2d 118, 122 (1960) (footnotes
omitted, emphasis added).
29. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 4.24.010 (Supp. 1974).
[Vol. 11:98
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Washington is the only state, other than Oklahoma, that allows recovery
for destruction of the parent-child relationship. Therefore, Washing-
ton's statute as construed by its state courts may be considered as a
guide for future interpretations of the Oklahoma statute.
The Washington Supreme Court construed the amended wrongful
death statute as granting recovery for "several integral . . . [and]
inseparable, elements of damage; viz., (a) loss of love, (b) loss of
companionship, and (c) injury to or destruction of the parent-child
relationship."30 The court went on to conclude:
We cannot refuse to give positive meaning to one of the
statutory phrases-"parent-child relationship"-merely be-
cause it is unique, and the language seems to have no readily
ascribable "ordinary meaning. .. .
We construe the language "loss of love . . .and .. .
injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship" to
provide recovery for parental grief, mental anguish and suffer-
ing as an element of damages intended by the legislature to be
recoverable under appropriate circumstances in cases involv-
volving the wrongful death of or injury to a child.31
The court reasoned that "intangible-physical" injuries were regu-
larly provided for and that there was no "substantial justification for
denial of recovery for 'intangible-emotiona' injuries."32 By definition,
the statutory phrase "loss of love and companionship of the child and
for injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship" was held to
involve "intangible emotional reactions and responses." 33 As a caution-
ary note, it was found that the "intangible-emotional injury" was subject
to certain limitations such as the necessity of "competent, often expert,
proof," for example, that of a psychiatrist.3
Because Washington and Oklahoma are the only states whose stat-
utes include the phrase "destruction of the parent-child relationship,"
there is little background regarding its meaning besides the ordinary
meaning of those words. There are no cases in Oklahoma dealing with
that term thus far and until definitive case law does evolve, it is help-
ful and authoritative to look to Washington's definitions and construc-
30. Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 94, 491 P.2d 1287, 1290 (1970) (emphasis in
original).
31. Id. at -, 491 P.2d at 1290 (emphasis in original). The facts showed that the
plaintiff-mother of the deceased five-year-old boy tried to admit psychiatric testimony of
her emotional anguish and harm as a result of the child's death. Because admission of the
evidence was denied, the decision was reversed and a new trial for damages ordered.
32. Id. at--, 491 P.2d at 1291 (emphasis in original).
33. Id. at-, 491 P.2d at 1292.
34. Id.
1975]
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tions for they are the only judicial expressions concerning the statutory
term.
The Washington Supreme Court, interpreting the statute in a re-
cent opinion, reaffirmed its earlier holding"5 that "the statutory terms
'loss of love and injury to or destruction of the parent-child relationship'
were intended by the legislature to add the elements of 'parental grief,
mental anguish and suffering' as elements of damages as well as those
elements contained within the term 'loss of companionship'."3
The Washington statute has also been construed not to limit dam-
ages for the loss of companionship and destruction of the parent-child
relationship to the period of the decedent's majority.3 Therefore, a jury
could award such damages for a period after the decedent would have
reached majority.
Loss of Monies Expended by Parents or Guardian in Support,
Maintenance and Education of such Minor Child
Perhaps the most radical extension of damages in the new statute is
in its last phrase, loss of monies expended by parents or guardian in
support, maintenance and education of such minor child. This contem-
plates a return of those expenditures made by a parent which are
considered an investment in his child. It is essentially a refund of the
"investment value!' the parent has in the decedent. 8
The necessary proof of damages for this element involves the
testimony of an expert, such as an economist, who can delineate the
different amounts a parent normally would spend for the support,
maintenance, and education of his child. The "important facts and
circumstances to be shown in the statistical approach to establishing the
parents' investment in the birth and rearing of a child wrongfully killed"
are:
-Estimate of cost to parents
-average annual family income
-age of parents
-age of child at time of death
-number of children in family
-- cost of prenatal and obstetrical care and of hospitaliza-
tion during birth
35. See Wilson v. Lund, 80 Wash. 2d 91, 491 P.2d 1287 (1971). See text accompa-
nying notes 30-34 supra.
36. Hinzman v. Palmanteer, 81 Wash. 2d 327, 329, 501 P.2d 1228, 1230 (1972).
37. Balmer v. Dilley, 81 Wash. 2d 367, 502 P.2d 456, 459 (1972).
38. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 4:27 (1966).
[Vol. 11:9 8
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-percentage of total family income required by child
year by year
-value of services performed by child. 9
REASONS FOR THE MORE LIBERAL WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE
What was the impetus behind the extraordinary broadening of
recoverable losses under the new wrongful death statute?
Apparently, the new Oklahoma statute is not based on any particu-
lar state's statute or on a specific case, but rather stems from a general
realization by the Oklahoma Trial Lawyers Association and the legisla-
tors who helped sponsor the bill" that a reform in the measure of
damages was necessary.
Proponents of a wrongful death statute providing for more liberal
damages, including loss of companionship, argue traditional damages
are inadequate.
Honest application of a pecuniary standard does not, in
today's world, allow adequate recovery for child-death. The
cost-accounting technique for measuring damages-value of
services less cost of support-is archaic in a society which is
not structured on child labor and the family chore framework
of an agricultural community. The careless driver today
usually does the parent of a deceased minor an economic
favor.
. . . [B]oth court and legislature have recognized that
today the injury sustained by a parent on the death of his
child is not primarily economic. The law recognizes an in-
terest in emotional and mental well-being. If this is the
primary interest invaded when a parent loses his minor child,
tort law should look to that injury, and fashion an appro-
priate remedy.
The pecuniary loss rule in wrongful death actions has long been
criticized; however reform allowing, in addition, damages for emotional
injury was delayed for two principal reasons:
First, there is probably "a lively fear [that] the overenthusiasm
of sympathetic juries" would lead to excessive awards and in-
39. Id. at 347.
40. According to State Rep. Charles Henry, Shawnee, Okla., principle sponsor, and
Jefferson G. Greer, Tulsa attorney and past President of the Oklahoma Trial Lawyers
Association, the principle drafter of House Bill No. 1336.
41. Recent Development, Wrongful Death of a Minor Child: The Changing Paren-
tal Injury, 43 WAsH. L. REV. 654, 655-56, 668 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
19751
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creased insurance premiums. Second, there is the objection
that any award would be arbitrary because no amount could
in fact compensate the survivors for their loss of companion-
ship and emotional hurt. 2
The authors of a statistical analysis of compensation for anguish"
found that these fears of consistently excessive awards under a statute
allowing damages for loss of comfort were groundless. They did admit
however, that under such a statute extraordinary awards may occasion-
ally be given." In the commentators' opinion actual pecuniary loss plays
only a minor role in influencing the amount of awards when compared
with other individual, local and state factors considered in adjudicating a
final award. 5 One of these factors has been the relaxation of strict proof
requirements in an effort to compensate for injuries which are not
encompassed by the pecuniary loss measure of damages.4"
Today most courts require only a token showing of loss of serv-
ices.47 Some jurisdictions, as indicated above, have softened the pecuni-
ary loss doctrine to allow substantial recovery. Other states, while allow-
ing more comprehensive loss damages, have used restraint in
determining awards by using comparable cases as a strict guide-
line.4 Setting maximum awards is another means of limiting dam-
ages.49 However, this method is precluded by the Oklahoma constitu-
tion.50
42. Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 885 (footnotes omitted).
43. Id.
44. See Compania Domicana de Aviacion v. Knapp, 251 So. 2d 18 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1971), cert. denied, 256 So. 2d 6 (Fla. 1971). In that case, a $1,800,000 award was
upheld in an action for the death of two of plaintiff's three sons which occurred when an
airplane crashed into the shop where the boys were working. A teacher testified that one
of the sons "stood head and shoulders above his contemporaries;" and a psychiatrist
testified as to the profound grief of the father who saw the accident, and of the mother
who had been speaking to one of the sons on the telephone when the accident happened.
45. Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 889-90.
46. Id. at 892. See Recent Development, Wrongful Death of a Minor Child: The
Changing Parental Injuruy, 43 WASH. L. REV. 654, 656 (1968).
47. Recent Development, Wrongful Death of a Minor Child: The Changing Paren-
tal Injury, 43 WASH. L Rnv. 654, 656 (1968).
48. Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 892.
49. See. e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1903 (Supp. 1974) with a limit of $50,000
and costs; ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2552 (Supp. 1974-75) limiting damages
to $10,000 for the death of a minor child in an action on behalf of the parents
for loss of consortium; W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1975) which limits damages
to $10,000 where there is no showing of pecuniary loss and a maximum of an additional
$100,000 if supported by evidence of pecuniary loss, plus reasonable funeral, hospital,
medical and other expenses; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (Supp. 1975 76) which provides a
limit of $5000 for loss of society. This list of statutes is not intended to be exhaustive.
50. OKLA. CONST. art. 23, § 7. See Producers' & Refiners' Corp. v. Castile, 89 Okla.
261, 267-68, 214 P. 121, 127 (1923).
[Vol. 11:9 8
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The foregoing analysis provides an answer to the opponents of
more liberal wrongful death statutes. The authors of the previously
mentioned statistical study stated:
Despite the seemingly greater latitude under an all-inclusive
loss statute, the statistics indicate that the goal of rational uni-
formity would be promoted by removing the conflict between
rule and impulse which is currently forced on decision-makers
in pecuniary loss jurisdictions. 1
Although the Oklahoma reform may provide more uniform awards, it is
estimated that awards in wrongful death actions for children may in-
crease as much as five to six times over the amounts that would have
been awarded under the original general wrongful death statute.5"
Oklahoma's new statute has brought about a long awaited and
necessary change in the law. States which allow recovery for loss of
companionship and other related damages are still not in the majority.
There were only twelve states in 1974 whose statutes specifically allowed
recovery to survivors for anguish and loss of comfort, 53 although addi-
tional states allow recovery for such damages through case law.54 At
least seven states have refused to allow such recovery.55 While not
51. Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 893.
52. Stated by Jefferson G. Greer, Tulsa attorney and past President of the Oklahoma
Trial Lawyers Association as well as the principle drafter of the new wrongful death
statute, in a conversation with the author.
53. See Finkelstein, supra note 19, at 884-85 n.3: (1) ARx. STAT. ANN. § 27-909
(1962); (2) FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.03 (1964); (3) HAWAi REV. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp.
1973); (4) KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (1964); (5) KY. REv. STAT. § 411.135 (1970);
(6) ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2552 (Supp. 1973); (7) MD. ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4
(Supp. 1973); (8) NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.090 (1973); (9) VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636
(Supp. 1973); (10) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § [4.]24.010 (Supp. 1973); (11) W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1973); (12) Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.04 (Supp. 1973).
The citations to some of the statutes listed in the above article have changed as
follows: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.21 (Supp. 1975-76); HAWAI Rv. STAT. § 663-3 (Supp.
1974); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-1904 (Supp. 1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 § 2552
(Supp. 1974-75); VA. CODE ANN. § 8-636.1 (Supp. 1975); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
4.24.010 (Supp. 1974); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Supp. 1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. §
895.04 (Supp. 1975-76).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 67 was repealed by Acts 1973, 1st Sp. Sess., ch. 2, § 2 effective
Jan. 1, 1974.
54. 25A C.J.S. Death § 104 (1966, Supp. 1975).
55. See Shockley v. Prier, 66 Wis. 2d 394, 225 N.W.2d 495, 499 n.2 (1975). See
also Smith v. Richardson, 277 Ala. 389, 171 So. 2d 96 (1965); Butler v. Chrestman,
264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972); Ekalo v. Constructive Service Corp. of America, 46 N.J.
82, 215 A.2d 1 (1965); Brennan v. Biber, 93 NJ. Super. 351, 225 A.2d 742 (Sup. Ct.
Lawv Div. 1966), affd per curiam, 99 N.J. Super. 247, 239 A.2d 261 (Sup. Ct. App. Div.
1968); Gilbert v. Stanton Brewery, Inc., 295 N.Y. 270, 67 N.E.2d 155 (1946); Kalsow v.
Grob, 61 N.D. 119, 237 N.W. 848 (1931); Quinn v. City of Pittsburgh, 243 Pa. 521, 90
A. 353 (1914); McGarr v. Nat'l & Providence Worsted Mills, 24 R.I. 447, 53 A. 320
(1902).
Shockley provides a notable innovation in the law by holding that parents in
1975]
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included in the above figures, Oklahoma has certainly taken a great step
forward by joining the states which have progressive wrongful death
statutes.
THE EFFECTIVE DATE OF THE NEW WRONGFUL
DEATH STATUTE
The pertinent language of the new wrongful death statute, effective
October 1, 1975,50 reads: "In all actions hereinafter brought to recover
damages: . ... "I
It is uncertain whether the statute can be retroactively applied to
actions filed after October 1, 1975 where the death of the child occurred
before the effective date. The better interpretation would be that ac-
tions filed after that date would receive the new statute's benefits. It is a
basic rule that a statute should be given prospective operation only, un-
less contrary legislative intent is expressed clearly or is necessarily im-
plied from language used."8 It can be argued that in this statute the
Legislature clearly intended partial retrospective effect by using the
words "in all actions hereinafter brought," thereby affecting a suit
brought after the effective date but in which the cause of action accrued
before the effective date.
The argument against retroactive effect is based on Phillips v. H.
A. Marr Grocery Co.,5 9 which involved a new statute granting extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction to hear claims for injuries incurred in another state.
The court held the statute was substantive, not purely procedural, and,
therefore, did not apply to an injury sustained prior to the effective date
of the act. However, that statute's wording is distinguishable from that
of the new wrongful death statute.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in Phillips:
"The general rule that statutes are to be construed as
prospective only, unless the language employed conclusively
negatives that construction, applied to remedial statutes, and
Wisconsin may maintain an action for loss of aid, comfort, society and companionship of
an injured, but not deceased, minor child against a negligent tortfeasor, provided that the
parents' cause of action is combined with that of the child for the child's personal
injuries.
56. 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 213-14, to be codified as OiRA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1055 (Supp.
1975).
57. Id.
58. Benson v. Blair, 515 P.2d 1363 (Okla. 1973); Freshour v. Turner, 496 P.2d 389
(Okla. 1972); Sunray DX Oil Co. v. Great Lakes Carbon Corp., 476 P.2d 329 (Okla.
1970).
59. 295 P.2d 765, 766 (Okla. 1956).
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such statutes will not be given retrospective or retroactive ef-
fect if to do so would impair or destroy contracts, disturb
vested rights, or create new obligations ...
S. . [Wihere the statute is not purely procedural, it will
not be so construed if the intention to give the act a retrospec-
tive effect is not so clearly found as to satisfy the court that
such was the intention, and if, from the reading of the act, the
court is doubtful whether such was the intention, the doubt
must be resolved against the retrospective effect." 60
The new wrongful death statute will almost certainly be determined
to be substantive rather than procedural, but whether it was clearly
intended to have a retrospective effect on actions accrued before but not
brought until after the effective date due to the phrase "in all actions
hereinafter brought' remains to be decided.
CONCLUSION
Oklahoma has enacted a far-reaching and progressive statute which
will allow recovery, in the event of the wrongful death of a child, for the
actual injuries that occur to the survivors. Thus, the woefully inadequate
pecuniary loss concept will no longer be the only measure of damages.
Also recoverable will be "loss of companionship and love of the child,
destruction of parent-child relationship and loss of monies expended
by parents or guardian in support, maintenance and education of such
minor child." 61 These phrases, though they have an ordinary meaning,
have already been subject to litigation in other states, notably in Wash-
ington. Case law has developed in Washington construing statutory lan-
guage similar to that contained in Oklahoma's statute, and, therefore,
provides persuasive authority for future litigation in Oklahoma.
Although there are many unanswered questions concerning the
new statute, judicial interpretation consistent with its legislative purpose
should remedy the inequities of the past rule. Then it will no longer be
necessary to resort to the unrealistic concept of pecuniary loss as the
basis for damages.
Such a reform in the area of adult wrongful death actions is also
contemplated with the proposal of a new bill which was written by the
drafters of the new wrongful death statute for minors and which will be
introduced in the next session of the Oklahoma Legislature.
60. Id. at 768, quoting 82 CJ.S. Statutes § 416 (1953).
61. 2 Okla. Sess. Laws 213-14, to be codified as OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 § 1055 (Supp.
1975).
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Damages under the new statute will be more stable and yet the
possibility of "runaway" awards cannot be ignored. The outcome is
unsure but it is certain that awards will be substantially larger. The
advantage of the new Oklahoma statute is that there is now an adequate
remedy for the real injuries occurring in the wrongful death of a child.
Ellen M. Hamilton
13
Hamilton: Wrongful Death of Children in Oklahoma: Statutory Expansion of Re
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 1975
